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Belgium and Denmark offer marked contrasts in many of their
labor market institutions.  Belgium has long been considered by many
as exemplifying the economic problem known as Eurosclerosis.
Indeed, Belgium did have (and to some extent still has) almost all of
the negative institutional characteristics often associated with poor
economic performance: high job protection, rigid wages, and generous
unemployment insurance compensation.  Denmark, on the other hand,
has long been considered as an example of a country that has success-
fully achieved a good balance between social protection and economic
growth.  Below we shall discuss the differences between the two coun-
tries in detail, but in Table 6.1 we present some of the features of the
two labor markets along with those of a selection of other countries, to
provide some context.  These rankings are taken from the World Eco-
472 Albæk, Van Audenrode, and Browning
nomic Forum’s 1997 global competitiveness report.1  The table gives
the rankings (for 5 out of 53 countries) for various labor market indica-
tors.  In each case a lower  ranking (closer to 1) means “more advanta-
geous for employers” (or, as conventionally seen, as bad for workers).
Of particular note is the fact that Belgium consistently has high scores,
indicating “negative” institutional characteristics.  On the other hand,
Denmark is much more mixed.  For example, it is seen as having gen-
erous unemployment insurance (UI) provisions but it also has the low-
est impediments to hiring and firing (lower even than Singapore or
Hong Kong).
Belgium and Denmark are both small open economies whose pri-
mary trading partner is Germany.  They also both have a relatively gen-
erous social safety net.  The major difference between their labor
markets is the higher firing costs in Belgium.  Thus it is very tempting
to compare the outcomes of workers in the two countries who are dis-
placed from a long-tenure job to identify how these outcomes differ
and whether they can be attributed to the differences in firing provi-
sions.  This comparison is made even more attractive by the availabil-
ity of two comparable administrative data sets describing the Belgian
and Danish labor markets.  In this work, we will use these data sets to
compare worker displacement and worker adjustment to displacement
in Belgium and Denmark.
LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
Employment Protection
As in the United States, Belgian law recognizes the basic principle
of employment at will.  Thus, with a few exceptions (for example,
union activity and pregnancy) employers rarely have to demonstrate
just cause when dismissing an employee.  Unlike the United States,
however, laying off workers can be very costly in Belgium due to sig-
nificant legislated notice periods and severance payments, especially in
the case of white-collar workers.  In Belgium, the required advance-
notice period for blue-collar workers is four weeks for workers with
fewer than 20 years of service, and eight weeks for those with more
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than 20 years.  Low-wage white-collar workers are given three months
of notice plus three months for every five completed years of senior-
ity.2  For high-wage white-collar workers, these are lower bounds.  The
actual period of notice has to be set in agreement between the employer
and the employee.  When no accord can be reached, the length of
notice is set by the labor courts.  According to Blanpain (1994), the
length of notice courts grant to these high-paid employees is a function
of age, specialization, tenure, and wage. These lengths can go as high
as 36 months.  Of course, these restrictions do not apply during trial
periods (generally two weeks for blue-collar  workers, but up to six
months for white-collar workers).  It is worth noting that during the
period considered here, protections were sharply reduced for some cat-
egories of white-collar workers.  In addition to notice, Belgian workers
(both blue- and white-collar workers) are given large severance pay-
ments in case of plant closings.  These payments amount to roughly
one month of salary per year of seniority, plus some additional com-
pensation for high-wage and older workers. Mass layoffs also require
some severance pay, although much less generous than plant closings.
In contrast to this, the Danish industrial relations system is charac-
terized by a small amount of interference from the state, which
includes some very limited employment-protection legislation.  There
are two major provisions in the legislation, which are both about
advance notice.  The first provision, which is limited to white-collar
workers, requires that advance notice be given.  The length depends on
the tenure of the worker, with a maximum length of six months.  This
set of rules was enacted in 1938.  The second set of provisions encom-
passes the different rules about mass layoffs enacted by the European
Union (EU).  The Danish legislation has followed the minimum
required by these EU rules, which have undergone some changes since
Denmark joined the EU in 1973.  The restrictions on the behavior of
the employers are moderate: they have to submit a notice to the
regional labor market board and they have to go into negotiations with
their employees before the layoff can be enacted.  Other than this, gen-
eral rules about employment protection are absent from the Danish
labor market.  Thus there is a complete absence of severance pay,
unless it has been agreed upon in a voluntary contract between the
employer and the single employee.  Such agreements are relatively
uncommon.  Just as in Belgium, procedures for dismissal are also
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absent; that is, employers are not required to act “fairly” or in a
“socially responsible” way.  It should be noted, however, that there are
some provisions for specific groups in the labor market; these include,
for example, pregnant workers, and workers on maternity leave, and
persons elected by their fellow workers as representatives for negotia-
tions with the employer.  These provisions do not apply in the case of
mass layoffs, however. 
Employment-protection provisions also play a close-to-negligible
role in Danish unions’ collective agreements.  With few exceptions,
Danish collective agreements do not include such employment-protec-
tion provisions as advance notice and severance or redundancy pay.
One of the reasons for this absence can be traced back to the formation
of the Danish collective bargaining system.  As in most other countries,
Danish employers tried to avoid recognizing the right of workers to
organize and bargain collectively.  After a four-month  nationwide gen-
eral lockout in 1899, the Confederation of Danish Employers con-
ceded.  In return for recognition the trade unions granted the employers
the “right to manage” in the “general agreement” between the two
organizations, which was the main outcome of the conflict.  The inter-
pretation of “right to manage” is the (nearly) unlimited formal right of
the employers to decide which workers to hire and which workers to
fire.
Wage Setting
Union membership is very high in Belgium, and coverage rates are
even higher.  All firms with 25 or more employees are de facto union-
ized, since they are required to have an elected works council, and only
union members can be elected to these councils.  Nonunionized firms
are covered by any relevant contract that has been extended.  Inside
firms, workers can choose not to be union members.  Those who do so
won’t pay dues, but they will still be covered by all the relevant agree-
ments. They cannot be candidates to the works councils, but they can
vote.   Finally, two or more unions can coexist and compete for mem-
bership inside the firm.
Wage bargaining in Belgium has a pyramidal structure, in which
contracts can be bargained at the national, industry, and firm level.
Agreements struck at a higher level immediately become lower bounds
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for bargaining at lower levels.  These of course limit downward real-
wage flexibility at the firm level, especially given the fact that as a gen-
eral rule, Belgian wages are automatically indexed.  The main feature
of the structure of the Belgian pattern of wage bargaining pertinent to
our study is the portability of seniority.  Workers changing jobs
between firms within the same bargaining unit (often an industry) keep
their accrued seniority.  This considerably limits a worker’s ability to
accept a wage cut, even if he or she is willing to do so.
As in Belgium, the Danish labor market is heavily unionized, with
80–90 percent of Danish workers being members of trade unions.  The
share of workers covered by collective agreements is not known;
recent figures of as low as 50 percent have been suggested, although a
more likely figure is about 75 percent.3
For the time period considered below, centralized negotiations in
the private sector took place every second year between the Confedera-
tion of Unions, which represents both skilled and unskilled workers,
and the Confederation of Employers.  For wages the negotiations
establish a minimum wage level, so that in more decentralized negotia-
tions afterwards (at the plant level, for example) lower wage levels
cannot be agreed to.  Other items in the centralized wage negotiations
are provisions about holidays, working hours, and overtime.  Bargain-
ing can also occur at several lower levels, including between single
employers and shop-stewards, and can cover a wider range of issues.
Interference by the state in the bargaining process is limited to the
centralized level and, then, only to instances where agreement has not
been reached.  The state does not extend contracts between employers
and unions to employers who are not covered by collective agreements.
There are no formal minimum wage laws in Denmark.  This implies
that despite the fact that the Danish system at face value looks very
unionized and centralized, there are loopholes with respect to the
acceptance of wage reductions.
Unemployment Insurance Provisions
The Belgian system of unemployment insurance is said to be one
of the most generous in the world (Burda 1988).  As a general rule,
benefits do not expire in Belgium.  They are reduced, however, after
both one and two years of unemployment.  In fact, a closer look at the
476 Albæk, Van Audenrode, and Browning
Belgian UI system indicates that it hardly qualifies as an insurance sys-
tem.  First, students can qualify for benefits even if they have never
been employed.  Second, and more importantly, benefits are means
tested.  The official replacement rate is 60 percent of the lost wage dur-
ing the first year of unemployment and 40 percent after that.  But, prac-
tically, these rates are meaningless.  Many UI recipients receive
compensation based entirely on family status and income.  Thus
“heads” of households receive a flat amount which can be higher than
60 percent of their lost wages, while the benefits of most other workers
are limited by a cap and are often below 60 percent of their lost wages.
Third, while there is a search requirement attached to UI benefits, this
requirement is hardly ever enforced.
At the beginning of this century the Danish state began to subsidize
the unemployment insurance system run by trade unions, who had set
up special UI funds for this task.  Since a reform of the system in about
1970, the UI funds no longer bear the marginal burden of expenditures
for unemployment benefit.  Each person pays a fixed fee in order to be
a member of the UI system and the Danish state covers the remaining
part of the expenditures.  The UI funds are, in principle, separate
administrative units, but in practice there is a close connection between
the unions and the UI funds.  The funds are closely regulated by the
state, however, with respect to benefit levels, entitlements, and so on.
One of the duties resting on the UI funds is to test that unemployed
members actually search for a job.  The general impression is that there
is considerable variation across UI funds with respect to the efficiency
with which this task is carried out.
Eligibility for unemployment benefit in Denmark is limited to per-
sons who are members of an unemployment insurance fund.   About 80
percent of Danish private sector workers are members of a UI fund.  In
order to become a member, workers have to fulfill a requirement of
work experience.  In the 1980s, six months of work within one year
was required.  However, persons who graduate from schools aiming at
a particular trade or as skilled workers in an apprenticeship system also
have a right to become members of a fund.
Concerning benefit levels, the Danish UI system is closer to a true
insurance scheme than the Belgian one in that it does not have a means
test for benefits.  At the same time, however, it also has many features
(such as the absence of differentiation with respect to risk) that reduce
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the insurance element.  It is considered generous compared to most
other countries, both with respect to the level and duration of benefits.
The maximum amount in unemployment benefit is 90 percent of the
previous wage, but this is obtained only by workers with low previous
wage levels.  At the beginning of the 1980s, the benefit level was
capped at about the average wage level for workers in the private sec-
tor.  Since that time, this maximum has been eroded considerably so
that now the average replacement ratio is about 65 percent.  Thus, Dan-
ish workers with high wage levels have a replacement ratio that is
somewhat lower than in many other countries.  Formally, there is a
maximum duration period, but until the beginning of the 1990s unem-
ployed workers could become eligible for continued benefits by partic-
ipating in a public employment scheme.  This implied that the duration
period was practically unlimited. 
Although the administration of UI funds is in the hands of individ-
ual trade unions, there is also a government labor exchange system that
is directly responsible for matching unemployed workers and vacan-
cies.  When a firm notifies the labor exchange of a vacancy, the latter is
required to identify a suitable unemployed worker and send him or her
for an interview.  If the worker is offered the job and refuses, the labor
exchange is required to contact the UI fund and the worker loses bene-
fits for five weeks.  This is the formal procedure, but the unions also
take an active role in finding jobs.
Overall, it is extremely difficult to make cross-country compari-
sons of the “harshness” of the pressure unemployed are exposed to
from authorities, labor unions, or social norms in society.  Within
Scandinavia, however, there is no doubt that the Danish system is more
easygoing than the Swedish and the Norwegian systems.  This applies
both with respect to the formal rules and to the way workers are
assigned to jobs.  One of the reasons is that trade unions in the other
Scandinavian countries are organized as industrial unions, while the
Danish ones are organized according to trade or education.  Thus, the
Danish system is somewhat more hesitant with respect to the demand
that the unemployed search for jobs for which they have not been edu-
cated.
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DATA
In this chapter, the aim of our procedures with respect to data
selection and definition of variables is to come as close as possible to
similar definitions for Belgium and Denmark, so that the results for the
two countries are as comparable as possible.  When it is possible or
desirable we adopt the definitions in Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993), which is the main study on displaced workers using administra-
tive data for the United States.  This implies that the results in this
study are to a certain extent comparable to the results for the United
States as presented in the study by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan.
In some instances we could come close to their study for one of our
countries, but not for the other.  In such cases we have chosen to select
the sample to maximize comparability between Belgium and Denmark.
A detailed description of the underlying data sets and our selection of
extracts therefrom, with a discussion of a broad range of comparability
issues between countries, is provided in the appendix to this chapter.
In what follows we provide a broad overview of the main data issues
relevant to understanding and interpreting our empirical results.
The Data Sets
For Belgium, we use administrative data from the Belgian social
security system.  All Belgian workers, with the exception of tenured
employees of the federal government, are included in that database.
The data provide one record per employee per employer per year, plus
information about potential spells of unemployment.  In these records,
we directly observe the age and gender of the worker, the wage, the
number of days worked, and a broad occupational classification (either
blue-collar or white-collar).  From these records, it is possible to recon-
struct employee and firm histories and a (censored) measure of tenure.
We do not, however, directly observe the reasons for separation from a
job.  Nor do we observe any family characteristics, so that we cannot
reconstruct UI benefit entitlements.  In our computations for both
countries, public sector jobs will be excluded (although workers who
are displaced from a private firm and find a job in the public sector will
be included).
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The Danish data are based on the fact that all Danish residents have
a personal number.  A very wide variety of transactions are recorded
against these personal numbers.  These data are then centralized and
collated by Danmarks Statistiks and are available for research purposes
(subject to very stringent controls to maintain confidentiality).  Thus,
in principle, it is possible to track all adult Danish residents from 1980
to 1994 (the latest year for which information is available) and to ana-
lyze a wide variety of behavior.  Moreover, individuals can be linked to
one another to form households and they can also be linked to the
plants at which they work, which can also be followed over time.  Thus
there is considerable scope for research into the labor market encom-
passing demographic and plant information.  In this study we take a
subsample of workers in private firms and follow them from 1980 to
1991.  Unfortunately, although the initial sample size is reasonably
large (37,319 workers), we are left with only a few workers in specific
strata, which somewhat limits the precision of some of the analysis.
For example, the restriction to high-tenure workers leaves only 15,860
workers and the number of these displaced in our chosen reference
year is only 547!
In both countries we focus on displacements that occurred in one
particular  “reference year,” close to the end of the data series available
to us.  Reference years were chosen to allow us to follow workers for
up to three years after displacement, and (by following workers before
displacement) to construct (left-censored) tenure measures for as long
as possible before displacement.  Our reference years are 1983 for Bel-
gium and 1988 for Denmark.  Aside from timing, the only other major
difference between the two data sets is the fact that the Belgian data are
firm-based, while the Danish are plant-based.  A second (minor) differ-
ence is that all point-in-time wage and employment variables for Bel-
gium are defined for the end of the year, whereas they are defined for
mid November for Denmark.
Defining Displacement
We will label as “displaced” all the workers who separate from a
firm (or plant) where employment has been reduced by 30 percent or
more during the reference year and which had more than five employ-
ees before this reduction in employment.  In the sample used below,
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multiple job holders are always excluded and workers having less than
three years tenure at the time of displacement are usually excluded.
We have also constructed two comparison groups.  The first one is
made up of workers with at least three years’ tenure who continued to
be employed at the end of the displacing year in firms (plants, for Den-
mark) which displaced workers.  The second comparison group is
made up of workers with at least three years’ tenure employed at other
plants or firms.  The exception to the three-year-tenure rule occurs
when we compute displacement rates.  Thus the analysis of the postdis-
placement outcomes below includes only workers with three years or
more of tenure and excludes multiple-job holders.  This study of out-
comes will look at displaced workers’ histories up to three years after
their job loss.
Firm or Plant Identification and “False Death”
Sometimes, firms or plants disappear from the Belgian and Danish
data.  According to the above definition, these firms will be treated as
displacing all their workers as they shrink to a size of zero (or “die”).
One potential problem with this is the possibility that firms may disap-
pear from the data not because they close, but because they are
acquired by another firm or are involved in some other kind of reorga-
nization that does not involve laying off the workforce.  Given differ-
ences in the nature of the data available to us, we deal with this “false
deaths” problem in somewhat different ways in the two countries under
study. 
In Belgium, firms are identified by a unique taxpayer number that
can survive change in ownership.  A firm ID number will change only
if the firm disappears as a corporation and all its debts have been paid
in full; the ID will not change if the corporation is taken over.  Given
the nature of Belgian industrial organization (big holding companies
holding shares in many corporations), corporations rarely disappear.
Mergers do happen though, and they are probably more rare than in the
United States.  Some firms also die and revive under different names.
To control for these possibilities we proceeded as follows: vanishing
firms where at least 70 percent of the workers were reemployed (at any
firm) in the next year, and where 70 percent of those rehired were
rehired in a single firm, were not considered to be displacing firms.4
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In Denmark, an establishment is considered (by Danmarks Statis-
tiks) to be  continuing from one year to the next if any one of the fol-
lowing four criteria is satisfied: there are the same owner and same
industry; there are the same owner and largely the same employees;
there are the same employees and the same industry; or there are the
same employees and the same address.  More precisely, “same indus-
try” means the same ISIC code at the 5-digit level.   “Same employ-
ees,” in the second case, means that at least 30 percent of the first
plant’s employees remain at the plant or make up at least 30 percent of
the second-year employees.  “Same employees,” in the third and fourth
cases, means that at least 30 percent of the first group of employees
remain at the plant and make up at least 30 percent of the second-year
employees.5
Even with such a classification scheme, it remains possible, of
course, to categorize workers as “displaced” even though we would not
consider them as being genuinely displaced.  This can happen if some
of the workers at one plant are taken over by another plant.  Our data-
base contains variables to take this situation into account.  In shrinking
but continuing plants, sometimes a group of two or more workers leave
the “main” plant and move to a second plant together.  Danmarks
Statistiks calls such plants “spinoffs.”  In such situations we classify
workers remaining in the main plant as not being displaced, but those
moving into the spinoffs as displaced.  Among plants that disappear
completely from the data, a plant is  considered to be “taken over” by a
new plant if at least two of its workers are employed in the new plant
and these workers constitute at least 30 percent of the workforce in the
closed plant.  Workers involved in such “takeovers” are not treated as




To put our results into context, we first examine some aggregate
statistics for Belgium and Denmark for the two years before and after
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our reference years, which are 1983 for Belgium and 1988 for Den-
mark.  These statistics are presented in Table 6.2.  In the period before
the reference year,  Belgium was suffering a recession and unemploy-
ment grew quite quickly (from 7.8 percent to 11.7 percent).  In con-
trast, the prereference years in Denmark were relatively healthy,
although the economy declined in the reference year.  The postrefer-
ence-year experiences are much more similar, except that average
manufacturing wages declined in Belgium but not in Denmark.  In both
countries unemployment increased a little in the postreference  period
even though there was modest real growth.  We take these statistics to
indicate that the postreference-year macro environment in the two
countries was similar and is unlikely to account for any large differ-
ences in outcomes that we observe below.
In Table 6.3 we present the incidence of displacement in Belgium
and Denmark (for all private sector workers).  Although there are some
significant differences, the most striking feature of this table is that
long-tenure workers (those with three or more years with the firm or
plant) are just as likely to be displaced in Denmark as in Belgium (3.45
percent and 3.41 percent, respectively).  This comes as something of a
surprise since, as we have seen, Belgium has very stringent layoff rules
and Denmark has very weak ones.  The major difference between the
two countries is that short-tenure workers in Denmark are more likely
to be displaced and Danish workers (short-tenure and long-tenure) are
much more likely to be displaced from a shrinking firm than from a
dying one.  There are two possible explanations for this last result.  It
may reflect the fact that in Belgium it is more difficult for firms that
continue in business to lay off workers, or it may be that Danish plants
are less likely to go out of business, perhaps because they are larger.
With the data at hand we are unable to distinguish between these alter-
natives.
In Table 6.4 we present some of the characteristics of displaced
workers.  Since our primary focus is on long-tenure workers, we
present results only for workers who had at least three years of tenure
at the plant or firm where they worked in the sample period.  We also
break down the sample by whether the firm closed down or not.
Finally, we present the same statistics for workers who continued in
“shrinking” firms and for those who were not in firms that displaced
workers (“other workers”).  Comparing the latter to the displaced sam-
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ple, we see that displaced workers in Belgium tend to have slightly
lower tenure (but remember that all the workers here have at least three
years’ tenure); to have lower wages; to be more likely to be blue-collar;
and to work for smaller firms than “other workers.” It is also clear that
women are more likely to be displaced.  There are similar differentials
for firm size, tenure, and being blue-collar in Denmark, but the differ-
ences in wages and gender composition are much smaller there.
Finally we present an analysis of the characteristics of the dis-
placed using a simple probit for being displaced (see Table 6.5); note
that here we include all workers, not just the long-tenure ones.  The
first column provides a comparison with “all nondisplaced workers”
and the second is a comparison with those who remain in displacing
firms.  In Belgium in the first comparison, the categories more likely to
be displaced are: male, blue-collar, lower wage, and low tenure.  Con-
trolling for tenure, workers in all age groups over 20 are more likely to
be displaced than teens, but there is no apparent age difference in dis-
placement rates between the ages of 20 and 59.  Workers over 60
appear to be at somewhat greater risk than workers with similar tenure
under 60.  The results for the comparison with those in displacing firms
are somewhat different.  In particular, the tenure effects are now stron-
ger (with workers with less than one year of tenure being much more
likely to be displaced than other workers).  Despite the differences in
sign, the age effects are similar (note that the comparisons are with the
“under twenty” group so that the change in sign tells us something only
about this group).  In Denmark, the probabilities of being displaced are
quite similar to those for the “other” comparisons in Belgium.  Thus
the first columns of Tables 6.4 and 6.5 give a similar picture in com-
parisons of who is displaced in the two countries except that for the
comparison with “nondisplaced” workers, the Danish results do not
show any significant differences in the tenure effects.  All in all, there
are only relatively minor differences between the personal characteris-
tics of workers who are displaced in Belgium and Denmark.  The main
differences seen in Table 6.4—in the proportion who are white-collar
workers and the firm size—reflect differences found in the “other
worker” sample.  As we shall see below, there are quite sharp differ-
ences in the postdisplacement experiences for workers in the two coun-
tries and the results presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 suggest that these
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differences in outcomes are unlikely to be due to the sample composi-
tion of the displaced groups.
Postdisplacement Employment Outcomes
In Table 6.6 we present some statistics on the unemployment out-
comes after displacement (once again, only for long-tenure workers).
Specifically, this gives details of how many months of unemployment
displaced workers experience in the three years after their displace-
ment.  It is most important to note that these statistics give information
on (registered) unemployment after displacement and not non-employ-
ment.  Thus, someone who withdraws from the labor force after dis-
placement or remains in the labor force but does not register as
unemployed would not be included in the “unemployed” here.  These
results reveal some extraordinary differences between Belgium and
Denmark and are quite different from experiences in other countries.
First, almost two-thirds of displaced Danish workers experience no
interruption in employment (or unemployment in the subsequent three
years) as against one-third for Belgium.  The latter figure is more in
line with the international experience, so one immediate worry is that
the Danish figure is incorrect.  One possibility is that in the Danish
sample we are misclassifying workers and our displaced sample actu-
ally includes some workers who found employment in other plants
within the same firm.  Although we cannot completely rule this out, as
we have documented in the data section above we have gone to great
lengths to ensure that we are not making such an error.  We also note
that the proportion of all workers in Denmark who experience some
unemployment in our reference year is 23 percent.  This is in line with
aggregate statistics that are compiled from different sources, leading us
to believe that our calculations are not seriously biased.
Turning to workers who do experience some unemployment, we
see that Danish workers are unemployed for an average of five months
but Belgian workers have average spells of 15 months (but note that
any spell is truncated above at 36 months).  Now it is the Belgian
results that are out of line with the wider international experience.  To
investigate these differences, we also present selected quantiles of spell
lengths in the lower portion of Table 6.6.  From these we see that Dan-
ish workers either move out of unemployment relatively quickly (more
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than 50 percent of those exiting unemployment do so within about two
months) or tend to stay for long spells.  In contrast, the majority of
workers who become unemployed in Belgium tend to have long
spells—less than one-half of them have left unemployment after one
year.
Combining the probability of having any unemployment and the
mean spell length, we see that a Belgian displaced worker has an
expected unemployment spell of about 10 months as against 6 weeks
for a Danish worker.  What could account for such large differences?
Here we list some possibilities, informally.  The first is that there is a
difference in definitions.  The definitions of unemployment in our two
samples are not exactly the same, but they are so close that it is not
credible that the differences in outcomes are attributable to this.  A sec-
ond possibility is that there are differences in sample composition, that
is, that the composition of the displaced worker groups are very differ-
ent in the two countries.  As we saw in Table 6.4, however, the two
samples appear to have similar personal characteristics so that it is
unlikely that it is this that accounts for the differences in unemploy-
ment outcomes.  A third possibility is that the differences are due to
differences in notice provisions.  As discussed in the institutions sec-
tion, workers in Belgium generally receive more advance notice of clo-
sures and mass layoffs than workers in Denmark.  Conventional search
models would then suggest the converse of what we observe.  Similar
remarks apply to a fourth possibility, namely, that the differences in
outcomes can be attributed to differences in UI systems.  Both Den-
mark and Belgium are usually regarded as having very generous UI
systems (see, for example, Table 6.1 above) but, as discussed in the
institutions section, this is something of an illusion for Belgium.  In
fact, an unemployed  worker in Denmark is more likely to receive high
benefits than a comparable worker in Belgium.  This is because Bel-
gian benefits are means tested so that married workers with an
employed spouse do not receive much.  Given this, we regard it as
extremely unlikely that the differences in unemployment outcomes in
Belgium and Denmark are due to differences in the UI system.  Indeed,
we can go further and question whether the “generosity” of the UI sys-
tem in Belgium “causes” the observed long unemployment spells,
given that the UI system in Denmark is at least as generous and unem-
ployment spells are much shorter.  This is clearly work for the future
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but we note here that this conclusion—that the long spells in Belgium
are unlikely to be solely the result of the UI system—highlights the vir-
tue of making cross-country comparisons. 
A fifth possibility is that the payment of severance pay to long-ten-
ure workers in Belgium facilitates longer unemployment spells there.
Certain aspects of the results presented here are consistent with this—
for example, the longer duration for the longest-tenure workers (see
upcoming discussion of Table 6.8).  Moreover, this effect is absent for
Denmark where severance pay is not usually given.  This is certainly
an explanation that deserves closer inspection.  Since the data at hand
do not report severance pay, we cannot follow this through here.  A
sixth possible explanation for the differences between the two coun-
tries is the different cyclical effects in the two countries.  As discussed
above, however, Belgium and Denmark experienced fairly similar
cyclical conditions after the reference year; it is difficult to believe that
such small differences could lead to such large differences in out-
comes.  Yet another alternative (number seven) is that because the UI
system in Denmark is administered by the unions they have more
incentive, or more ability, to find displaced workers new jobs.  With
respect to this hypothesis it is sufficient to note that although the
unions administer UI payments they have no direct financial incentive
to move workers from unemployment to a new job.  It thus seems
unlikely that unions’ incentives explain the difference between the
countries.
An eighth alternative is that labor-demand conditions differ signif-
icantly between the two countries.  Although the cyclical conditions in
the countries are similar, it is still possible that there could be perma-
nently lower arrival rates of job offers in Belgium.  In a conventional
search model this would lead to longer unemployment durations.  This
would also be consistent with the major difference in employers’ firing
flexibility between the two countries: high firing costs in Belgium lead
to employers being less willing to hire and, consequently, to longer
unemployment durations.  If this explanation is to be consistent with
the roughly equal unemployment rates in the two countries (see Table
6.2), then it means that flows into unemployment must be much higher
in Denmark.  Given that displacement rates in Denmark are not dra-
matically higher than in Belgium (see Table 6.3), the bulk of Danish
unemployment has to be the result of something other than displace-
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ment; for example a higher quit rate.  We cannot check this with the
data at hand, but this is clearly a promising avenue of future research. 
Finally, it could be that the differences arise because Danish wages
are less rigid downwards.  The aggregate figures on wage growth given
in Table 6.2, however, suggest that, if anything, the converse is the
case.  These show that the average wage in Belgium declined in the
year after the sample year but Danish wages did not.  On the other
hand, these aggregate changes may be masking changes for displaced
workers in Denmark who take a job.  Thus we need to look at what
happened to the earnings and wages of reemployed displaced workers.
We shall do this shortly.  For now we anticipate those results and state
that  we do not believe that the very large differences in unemployment
outcomes are attributable to a greater propensity for unemployed Dan-
ish workers to accept lower wages.
To complement the unemployment statistics of the previous table,
we present reemployment rates at annual intervals after the displace-
ment in Table 6.7.  These largely confirm the analysis above—Belgian
displaced workers have much lower subsequent reemployment rates
than Danish displaced workers, particularly in the year after the dis-
placement.  One additional interesting feature in Table 6.7 is that Bel-
gian workers who were in a shrinking firm in the reference year but
were not displaced are significantly less likely to be employed in later
years than “other” workers.  This is not the case for Denmark—the
employment rates for “other” workers and workers who stayed with
shrinking firms are almost identical.  Once again, the likeliest explana-
tion for this is the difference in firing costs: Danish firms  adjust more
quickly to negative demand shocks and are less likely to experience
persistent downsizing.
We end the analysis of reemployment with a regression analysis of
the determinants of reemployment.  Coefficients from comparable Cox
partial likelihood models of unemployment durations in both countries
are presented in Table 6.8.  These coefficients give the (assumed pro-
portional) impacts of different characteristics on the probability of
being reemployed.  In Denmark we can draw no firm conclusions
regarding the determinants of reemployment, due to the small sample
size.  In Belgium, reemployment is significantly more likely for men,
for white-collar workers, high-wage workers, young workers, and
(controlling for age) high-tenure workers.  As was discussed in Chapter
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2 of this volume, this positive effect of tenure may reflect the greater
advance notice and other reemployment assistance provided to senior
workers under Belgium’s strict system of employment protection law.
Postdisplacement Wages and Earnings
We turn now to earnings and wages for those who find a job.  We
present statistics on earnings in the years after displacement in Table
6.9; once again these are for long-tenure workers.  The preparation of
these figures makes them somewhat different from those presented for
the United States by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).  In the
latter study the possibility of out-of-state migration (with consequent
attrition from the sample) meant that Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
had to condition on having some positive earnings in all of the compar-
ison years after the displacement. In our analysis we condition only on
being in employment at the end of the relevant year (actually, in
November for Denmark—see the appendix for more details).  In the
top panels of  Table 6.9 we present average earnings in the year, condi-
tional on our employment condition, so these are comparable to those
given by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan.  These averages are not for
the same people in each year so that employment change, wage
changes, and selection are all confounded.  In the lower panel we
present mean log differences in annual earnings as compared to the dis-
placement year so that the comparison in any year is with the same
workers in the reference year (year 0).  The most obvious feature of the
lower panels is the very large drop for displaced workers in Belgium in
the year after displacement.  This reflects the fact that Belgian dis-
placed workers are more likely than Danish displaced workers to have
only part-year employment in the year after, even if they are back in
work one year later.  There is also a strong decline in year two for Bel-
gian “nondisplaced workers at displacing firms.”  This mirrors the per-
sistence in displacement seen in Table 6.7.  Comparing the results for
the two countries, we see that for Denmark even “other workers”
record a small loss in earnings (of 1.5 percent) over the three years
while displaced workers have a larger loss of 8.3 percent.  Thus, Dan-
ish displaced workers seem to have a medium run earnings loss of
about 6.8 percent as compared to “other workers.”  In Belgium, how-
ever, three-year earnings losses are actually smaller for displaced
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workers than for “other workers.” Indeed, Belgian workers who were
not displaced (“other workers”) experienced an earnings loss of 7.6
percent in the year after the reference year.  This is consistent with the
macro evidence on wage and employment changes in year one given in
Table 6.2.
In Table 6.10, we present average wage levels and log wage
changes.  Once again, we concentrate on the latter.  For wages the per-
verse effect noted for earnings for Belgium disappears.  Now both Dan-
ish and Belgian workers show a decline relative to “other” workers.
The order of the decline for Denmark is similar to that of earnings (a
relative loss of 6.4 percent as against a relative loss of 6.8 percent for
earnings).  This suggests that all of the relative medium run negative
impacts on earnings for Danish workers are driven by wage losses and
not employment changes.  In contrast, Belgian displaced workers suf-
fered a relative wage loss of 3.7 percent as against a relative earnings
gain of 6 percent.  It is important in interpreting these results to keep in
mind that we are always conditioning on being back in work at the end
of the relevant year.  For the reasons discussed above, this probably
does not matter much for Denmark but in Belgium those who have
found a job after one year are the exception rather than the rule.  The
finding that displaced Belgian workers who are reemployed are doing
relatively better than those who were not displaced seems very likely to
be a selection effect. 
We finish our analysis in Table 6.11 with a regression of the wage
loss for those who are reemployed within two years of the displace-
ment.  For both countries the coefficient on the lagged wage is signifi-
cantly less than 1 so that higher wage workers lose relatively more.
Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for Denmark, suggesting that
higher wage workers in Denmark do a good deal worse; this is consis-
tent with the earlier analysis suggesting that Danish workers go back to
work much more quickly and suffer some wage loss as a consequence.
There is no significant effect of age for workers aged between 20 and
60 but workers aged over 60 who choose to go back to work suffer
very large falls: 14 percent for Belgium and 28 percent for Denmark.
Both countries also show much larger wage losses for women (15 per-
cent for women relative to men for Belgium and 17 percent for Den-
mark).  Given that the reemployment probabilities seem to be lower for
women than for men (see Table 6.8), this is clearly an important area
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for future research.  One other notable feature is that postdisplacement
wage losses do not seem to be correlated with tenure (given the selec-
tion on having at least three years of tenure). 
CONCLUSIONS
We have compared the displacement experience in two coun-
tries—Belgium and Denmark—that share some common features in
their labor market institutions but that also display significant differ-
ences.  In particular, both have what are thought to be generous UI sys-
tems, but firing costs in Belgium are high relative to other countries
whereas firing costs in Denmark are very low by international stan-
dards.  We found that displaced workers in Denmark are more likely to
be displaced from a firm that continues in existence than are displaced
Belgian workers.  This is consistent with the fact that firing costs are
much higher for Belgian firms and that, consequently, they are less
likely to shed workers if they stay in business.  Apart from this we did
not find significant differences in the predisplacement characteristics
of displaced workers in the two countries.  When we compared postdis-
placement outcomes we found very significant differences in employ-
ment outcomes but only relatively minor ones in wage losses for those
who are reemployed.  Belgian workers have an expected unemploy-
ment spell of ten months while Danish workers have an expected spell
of only six weeks.  We reviewed a number of possible explanations for
this difference.  In particular, we rejected the proposition that the
longer Belgian spells are due to the UI system since the Danish UI sys-
tem is even more likely to induce long unemployment spells.  We con-
cluded that of all of the explanations we examined, only one is likely to
be the cause of the longer spells, namely, that there are permanent dif-
ferences in the demand side and Belgian workers face a much lower
arrival rate of job offers.  This lower propensity to hire by Belgian
firms is consistent with the differences in firing costs. 
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Van Audenrode carried out the analysis on the Belgian data and Albæk and Browning
the analysis on the Danish data.  This work was supported in part by an EU grant.  We
thank Martin Junge for his excellent research assistance and Peter Kuhn and confer-
ence participants for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. World Economic Forum rankings are based on a combination of objective infor-
mation and employers’ subjective rankings of the difficulty of making employ-
ment adjustments.  See World Economic Forum 1997.
2. The threshold between low and high wages is set by decree and indexed.
3. Using a survey of private sector employees, Scheuer (1997) found that only 52
percent of the respondents answered that they were covered by a collective agree-
ment.  This figure is low compared to other information, including a more recent
survey of about 2,000 firms with more than ten employees conducted by Statistics
Denmark.  In this survey, 69 percent of firms indicated that a majority of their
employees were covered by collective agreements.  When weighted by the num-
ber of employees in the firms, these responses suggest that 83 percent of the
workers in firms with more than ten employees are employed in firms where the
majority of workers are covered by collective agreements.  However, the cover-
age among firms with less than ten employees is probably considerably below that
for larger firms (the coverage among firms with 10–19 employees was 63 per-
cent).  Given that about 20 percent of Danish workers work in plants with fewer
than ten employees and the 63 percent applies to firms with fewer than ten work-
ers, then we get an average coverage of 79 percent.  This figure is an upper bound.
If we assume 50 percent coverage for firms with fewer than ten employees then
we have an overall coverage of 76 percent.  On the basis of these calculations, an
estimate of 75 percent coverage of collective agreements among private sector
employees seems reasonable.
4. A dying firm from which fewer than 70 percent of its workers failed to become
reemployed would automatically be considered a displacing firm according to our
30 percent employment-reduction criterion above.
5. Although our data contain only a small sample of workers, it is important to note
that the counts on which these definitions of continuity are based were generated
by Danmarks Statistiks from the full population of employees at all plants.  Thus
we avoid the sampling and inference problem confronted by Bender et al. in their
analysis of the French data in this volume.
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Table 6.1 Labor Market Characteristics (Ranking out of 53 countries)










Belgium 39 46 52
Canada 10 11 24
Denmark 1 10 46
U.K. 8 5 10
U.S.A. 7 8 5
SOURCE: World Economic Forum (1997).
Time to displacement year
Characteristic –2 –1 0 1 2
Year
Belgium 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Denmark 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Real GDP growth rate
Belgium –1.4 1.5 –0.1 1.3 2.1
Denmark 3.6 0.3 1.2 0.6 1.4
Employment growth rate
Belgium –0.1 –2.0 –1.3 –1.1 0.0
Denmark 2.6 0.5 –0.6 –0.5 0.0
Unemployment rate
Belgium 7.8 10.0 11.7 12.9 12.9
Denmark 7.9 7.9 8.7 9.5 9.7
Inflation
Belgium 7.6 8.7 7.7 6.3 5.2
Denmark 3.3 4.0 4.5 4.6 2.6
Growth in real manufacturing 
wages
Belgium 1.4 –1.4 –1.7 –2.1 1.4
Denmark 1.5 0.4 2.0 0.3 1.8
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Table 6.3 Incidence of Displacement among Private Sector Workers in 
Belgium and Denmark (%)
Group of workers Total Firms shrinking Firms dying
Belgium
All displaced 4.78 2.67 2.11
≥ 3 yr. tenure 3.41 1.80 1.61
Denmark
All displaced 6.61 4.96 1.65
≥ 3 yr. tenure 3.45 2.84 0.61
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.4 Characteristics of Displaced Workers with Tenure of at least 
Three Years in Belgium and Denmark 
Belgium Denmark
Group Mean Std. error Mean Std. error 
All displaced workers
Proportion men 0.68 0.002 0.68 0.02
Proportion white-collar 0.36 0.002 0.48 0.021
Age (yr.) 38.66 0.056 41.1 0.49
Tenure (yr.) 5.09 0.006 5.77 0.088
Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure 0.56 0.002 0.56 0.496
Proportion displaced because of closure 0.48 0.002 0.18 0.016
Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr) 1942 6.77 128.8 2.7
Average size of firm (no. of workers) 23.37 0.82 45.7 5.39
Number of observations 42,255 n.a.a 547 n.a.
Displaced workers in dying firms
Proportion men 0.656 0.003 0.667 0.049
Proportion white-collar 0.332 0.003 0.563 0.051
Age (yr.) 37.95 0.080 40.4 1.18
Tenure (yr.) 5.104 0.008 5.57 0.212
Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure 0.567 0.003 0.479 0.051
Proportion displaced because of closure 1.000 n.a. 1.00 n.a.
Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr) 1.865 8.87 125.3 6.14
Average size of firm (no. of workers) 20.330 1.242 27.3 4.40
Number of observations 20,294 n.a. 96 n.a.
Displaced workers in shrinking firms
Proportion men 0.707 0.003 0.683 0.022
Proportion white-collar 0.393 0.003 0.457 0.023
Age (yr.) 39.32 0.079 41.2 0.540
Tenure (yr.) 5.082 0.008 5.81 0.097
Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure 0.555 0.003 0.528 0.023
Proportion displaced because of closure 0 n.a. 0 n.a.
Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr) 2,014 10.10 129.6 3.01
Average size of firm (no. of workers) 24.824 1.057 50.8 6.77
Number of observations 21,961 n.a. 451 n.a.
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Belgium Denmark
Group Mean Std. error Mean Std. error 
Nondisplaced workers in displacing firms
Proportion men 0.704 0.002 0.660 0.019
Proportion white-collar 0.369 0.002 0.544 0.020
Age (yr.) 39.746 0.057 40.7 .4400
Tenure (yr.) 5.772 0.008 5.68 0.084
Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure 0.542 0.003 0.497 0.020
Proportion displaced because of closure n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr) 2,053 8.54 127.4 2.03
Average size of firm (no. of workers) 24.824 1.057 69.5 11.03
Number of observations 39,231 n.a. 608 n.a.
Other workers
Proportion men 0.732 0.000 0.668 0.004
Proportion white-collar 0.454 0.000 0.542 0.004
Age (yr.) 39.288 0.010 41.0 0.087
Tenure (yr.) 5.386 0.001 6.14 0.017
Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure 0.703 0.000 0.608 0.004
Proportion displaced because of closure n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr) 2,294 1.35 131.2 .499
Average size of firm (no. of workers) 49.120 1.548 66.7 2.03
Number of observations 1,104,004 n.a. 14,705 n.a.
a n.a. = Not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.5 Factors Affecting the Probability of being Displaced, 
Compared with Nondisplaced Workers in Belgiuma and 
Denmarkb
Belgium relative to Denmark relative to
Worker group  All workers
  Workers in 
displacing plants 
or firms  All workers
  Workers in 
displacing plants 
or firms
Male 0.043 (.004) –0.008 (0.009) 0.025 (0.023) 0.171 (0.048)
White-collar –0.122 (0.003) –0.014 (0.008) –0.176 (0.022) –0.213 (0.047)
log(wage) –0.291 (0.004) –0.066 (0.009) –0.117 (0.025) –0.206 (0.054)
Aged 20–29c 0.153 (0.008) –0.133 (0.024) –0.112 (0.037) –0.104 (0.080)
Aged 30–39 0.161 (0.008) –0.270 (0.024) –0.137 (0.041) –0.188 (0.088)
Aged 40–49 0.161 (0.008) –0.304 (0.025) –0.119 (0.042) –0.236 (0.090)
Aged 50–59 0.172 (0.009) –0.304 (0.025) –0.135 (0.048) –0.344 (0.098)
Aged 60 or over 0.250 (0.013) –0.245 (0.032) 0.044 (0.093) –0.160 (0.185)
Tenure of 1 yr.d 0.128 (0.005) –5.95 (0.062) –0.234 (0.029) –0.279 (0.061)
Tenure of 2 yr. 0.017 (0.007) –6.16 (0.063) –0.333 (0.036) –0.414 (0.074)
Tenure of 3 yr. –0.051 (0.007) –6.13 (0.063) –0.473 (0.046) –0.539 (0.092)
Tenure of 4 yr. –0.020 (0.007) –6.02 (0.064) –0.445 (0.051) –0.463 (0.102)
Tenure of 5 yr. –0.033 (0.008) –6.09 (0.064) –0.470 (0.063) –0.407 (0.126)
Tenure of 6 yr.+ –0.209 (0.005) –6.16 (0.063) –0.594 (0.033) –0.340 (0.069)
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.106 0.045 0.044
Sample size 1,861,806 142,275 37,319 3,494
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
a For Belgium, probit analysis of being displaced during 1983 (dependent variable = 1
if displaced).
b For Denmark, probit analysis of being displaced during 1988 (dependent variable = 1
if displaced).
c Omitted age is “less than 20.”
d Omitted tenure is “less than one year.”
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Table 6.6 Unemployment for Long-Tenure Displaced Workers in the 
Three Years after Displacement
Belgium Denmark


















NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Does not include non-employment spells
that are not registered as unemployment.
a Maximum is set to 36 months.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.7 Reemploymenta after Displacement in Belgium and Denmark 
(Share of workers employed)
Years after displacement
Group 0 1 2 3
Belgium





































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
a Proportion employed at the end of the year (Belgium) or in November of the year
(Denmark).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.8 Duration Analysis of Reemployment for Long-Tenure 
Workers in Belgium and Denmark
Group of workers Belgium Denmark
Male 0.095 (0.014) 0.117 (0.202)
White-collar 0.142 (0.013) –0.325 (0.193)
Log(wage) 0.192 (0.015) 0.221 (0.412)
Aged 20 to 29a –0.090 (0.057) –0.315 (1.082)
Aged 30 to 39 –0.200 (0.057) –0.234 (1.094)
Aged 40 to 49 –0.417 (0.058) –0.366 (1.108)
Aged 50 to 59 –0.941 (0.059) –0.577 (1.105)
Aged 60 or over –1.686 (0.075) –0.709 (1.226)
Tenure of 4 yrs.b –0.019 (0.020) –0.282 (0.298)
Tenure of 5 yrs. 0.106 (0.021) 0.615 (0.364)
Tenure of 6+ yrs. 0.137 (0.017) 0.163 (0.230)
Sample size 42,223 135
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Cox non-parametric estimation of reem-
ployment hazard, compared to all nondisplaced workers, workers with three or more
years of tenure only. 
a Omitted age is “less than 20.” 
b Omitted tenure is “three years.”
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Table 6.9 Average Annual Earnings and Earnings Growth for Long-
Tenure Workers by Years after Displacement
Panel –1 yr. 0 1 yr. 2 yr. 3 yr.
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workerse
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a BF = Belgian francs.  Sample selection = wage rate positive at end of relevant year.
b  Earnings growth for long-tenure workers is in parentheses.
c n.d. = No data available.
d DKr = Danish kroner.  Sample selection = wage rate positive in November of relevant
year.
e Growth is measured by log(Earningst) – log(Earnings0).
f Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.10 Average Wages and Wage Growth for Long-Tenure 
Workers
Years after displacement
Panel –1 0 1 2 3
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aDaily wage rates in 1981 Belgian francs.  Sample selection: wage rate positive at end
of the relevant year.
b n.d. = no data available.
c Wage growth for long-tenure workers is in parentheses.
d Hourly wage rates in 1988 Danish kroner.  Sample selection: wage rate positive in
November of the relevant year.
e Wage growth is measured as log(Waget) – log(Wage0).
f Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.11 Regression Analysis of Wages in Subsequent Job
Variable Belgium Denmark
Log wage on lost job 0.587 (0.005) 0.382 (0.054)
20 < Age ≤30 –0.022 (0.016) 0.595 (0.133)
30 < Age ≤ 40 –0.006 (0.016) 0.611 (0.134)
40 < Age ≤50 –0.020 (0.016) 0.614 (0.135)
50 < Age ≤60 –0.016 (0.016) 0.498 (0.137)
Age > 60 –0.159 (0.022) 0.332 (0.215)
Male 0.148 (0.004) 0.174 (0.043)
White-collar 0.167 (0.004) 0.073 (0.041)
Tenure = 4 yr. 0.003 (0.006) –0.062 (0.059)
Tenure = 5 yr. –0.010 (0.006) –0.099 (0.068)
Tenure = 6 yr. or more –0.003 (0.005) –0.051 (0.049)
Lost job firm dead 0.033 (0.003) 0.027 (0.048)
Size of lost job firm 0.001 (0.001) 0.008 (0.014)
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.26
Sample size 27,567 408
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS for wage in a new job in Belgium in
1985 (two years after a displacement in 1983) and in Denmark in 1990 (two years




Data Selection and Definitions
EMPLOYER SIDE
Plants or Firms
For the Belgian data set the unit is firms, but for the Danish data set it is
plants.  However, the Danish data set contains a variable that indicates if a
worker transfers from one plant to another in the same firm.  These workers are
not considered displaced workers in this study; they are placed in the control
groups (the group of stayers or nondisplaced workers in displacing plants).
Nevertheless, the difference between firm unit and plant unit is probably the
major problem in this study with respect to comparability between the two
countries.
The Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) study (hereinafter called
“JLS”)  appears to analyze firms.  JLS (p. 706) stated that the basic statistics
are based on “Pennsylvania Unemployment Insurance (UI) tax reports and the
state ES202 data on firms’ employment.” The issue is perhaps not quite clear,
however, since they have no explicit discussion about plants or firms as units.
JLS (p. 687) mentioned “firm” but it also mentioned “geographical location.”
Both a plant and a single-plant firm have a “geographical location,” while this
term is not unambiguous for a multi-plant firm, either.
Size Reduction of Plants or Firms 
In our study workers are considered displaced if they separate from a firm
(Belgium) or plant (Denmark) which experiences a 30 percent reduction in the
workforce from one year to the next.  This 30 percent rule will produce more
displaced workers when applied to plants than when applied to firms.  In gen-
eral one would expect that it is more serious to separate from a downsizing firm
than from a downsizing plant, as firms can reallocate the separated workers to
another of their plants.  These reallocated workers are not considered displaced
in our Danish data set, however, as mentioned. 
The JLS study also applied a 30 percent downsizing threshold, but they did
not apply this rule to year-to-year changes in employment.  Instead they applied
the following definitions:   “. . . separators whose firms’ employment in the
year following their departure was 30 percent or more below their maximum
level during the late 1970s”  (JLS, p. 688). 
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Size of Plant or Firm (Cutoff Point)
In this study we eliminate firms (Belgium) and plants (Denmark) with five
or fewer employees.  This cutoff point is applied to one particular year.  The
main reason for the comparatively small cutoff point is that a higher one would
reduce the sample size of displaced workers for Denmark to too low a level.
The JLS study had a cutoff point of 50 employees in one particular year, 1979
(p. 688). 
 Identity of Establishments (False Death Problem)
In Belgium, firms are identified by a unique taxpayer number that can sur-
vive a change in ownership.  A firm ID number will change only if the firm dis-
appears as a corporation and all its debts have been paid in full.  It will not
change if the corporation is taken over.  Given the nature of Belgian industrial
organization (big holding companies holding shares in many corporations),
corporations rarely disappear.  Mergers do happen, however, although they are
probably more rare than in the United States.  Some firms also die and revive
under a different name.  To control for that possibility we proceeded as follows:
dying firms from which at least 70 percent of the workers were rehired (so as
not to meet our criteria for being called a displacing firm) and 70 percent of
those rehired were rehired in a single firm were not considered to be displacing
firms.
For Denmark, the IDA database1 considers an establishment as continuing
if just one of the following four criteria is satisfied: 1) same owner and same
industry, 2) same owner and same employees, 3) same employees and same in-
dustry, or 4) same employees and same address.  More precisely, “same indus-
try” means the same ISIC code at the five digit level, and “same employees”
(in case 2) means that either at least 30 percent of the earlier employees remain
at the plant or these employees make up at least 30 percent of the second-year
employees, while “same employees” (in case 3 and 4) means that at least 30
percent of the earlier employees remain at the plant and they make up at least
30 percent of the second-year employees.  Moreover, a reduction in the work-
force in a plant could also take place when one would not consider the workers
as genuinely displaced.  This could be the case if a share of the workers at a
plant were taken over by another plant.  The IDA database contains variables
to take this situation into account.  For continuing plants, these plants are con-
sidered “non-identical” if at least two workers find employment in another
plant.  The creators of the IDA database called these workers “spin offs.”   A
second such situation would concern closed plants which are considered “taken
over” by another plant if the other plant employs at least two of the earlier
workers and these workers constitute at least 30 percent of the workforce in the
closed plant.  The creators of the IDA database called these workers “take
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overs.”  For the present purpose, to ensure maximum comparability between
Belgium and Denmark, the following rules apply: The “spin offs” are consid-
ered displaced workers (although “spin offs” within a firm are not).  The “take
overs” are not considered displaced workers (they are placed in the category
“other workers”).
For the U.S. case, JLS stated p. 707: “. . . [it is] important to account for
cases in which a firm’s employer identification number (EIN) changes from
one period to the next, . . .” and “In cases of mergers and divestitures that oc-
curred during the sample period, we treated the separate parts as a single firm,
even in years when they were legally distinct.” 
Public Sector Exclusion
The present study considers displacement only from the private sector.
The analysis of displacement from the public sector is problematic in both the
Belgian and Danish cases.  The Belgian data set contains no observations for
some of their public sector employees.  The present version of the Danish IDA
database contains considerable measurement errors with respect to plant size.
Therefore public sector employees are excluded from the initial state of analy-
sis.  If a worker displaced from the private sector gets a job in the public sector,
the observation is kept in the sample and the subsequent wage rate in the public
sector job enters into the calculations. 
In the JLS study, there was no explicit discussion of this topic.  Perhaps
U.S. economists are supposed to know if the public sector is included in
“ES202 data on firms’ employment.” 
 EMPLOYEE SIDE
Multiple Jobholders, Identification of Main Employer, 
Timing during the Year
For the identification of a worker’s main employer in Denmark, the IDA
definition is used.  This means that employed workers at one particular date in
the middle of November are assigned to the plant from which they received
their main earnings.  For Belgium, the employer that comes closest to an em-
ployment relationship in November is used: in most cases this amounts to the
last employment relationship during the calendar year.
The JLS study allowed only one employer-employee relationship within a
year, that where there was the “greatest amount of earnings during the year”
(p. 707). 
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Multiple Jobholders, More Than One Employment Relationship 
by the End of the Year
For Belgium, those workers who have two jobs at the time of displacement
and fulfill the tenure condition of three or more years of employment in both
of them are deleted from the sample.  For Denmark, IDA contains an indication
of “side employment” besides the main job (the one with the highest earnings)
in November.  There is no tenure variable for these “side jobs.” Displaced
workers with “side jobs” are retained in the calculations. 
Wages
For Belgium, wages are wage income per day.  In calculating this figure
the numerator is the wage income during the year in the firm and the denomi-
nator is the number of days employed in the firm.  For Denmark, wages are
wage income per hour.  In calculating this figure the numerator is the wage in-
come during the year in the plant and the denominator is the number of estimat-
ed hours employed in the plant.  The assessment of the number of hours worked
is based on weekly contributions to a pension scheme, for which the size of the
contribution depends on the number of working hours.  There are some mea-
surement errors contained in the IDA data on the number of hours worked. 
The JLS study did not consider wages.
Earnings, Annual
For both Belgium and Denmark we consider wage earnings during the cal-
endar year, including the wage income from all plants or firms in which the
worker has been employed.  Nominal earnings are deflated by the consumer
price index in the two countries (this index is also used for deflating wages).
We select workers with positive wage rates.  In the Danish case we have wage
rates only for workers who are employed at the November date when workers
are assigned labor market status including plant affiliation.  These workers are
the ones that are included in Table 6.10, the table describing the development
of wages after displacement (that is the only possibility for Denmark since we
do not have wage rates for workers who are not employed at the November
date).  The figures used in such an earnings table are the early earnings (wage
income) from all employers (not only the employer at the November date).
Such an earnings table ensures comparability with the table over wage losses
since the drop in earnings can be decomposed into a wage loss and a drop in
hours.  Precisely the same individuals figure in the wage table and the earnings
table.  This means, however, that we exclude many workers who have positive
earnings during the year, but who are not employed at the November date.
Such workers might be unemployed most of the year and have just a small
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number of working hours placed somewhere during the year, but not at the No-
vember date.
We also include displaced workers who do not have a positive wage rate.
In the previous procedure we included only those workers who were fortunate
enough to have a positive wage rate after displacement.  The conjecture must
be that those workers who do not have positive wage rates fare worse with re-
spect to early earnings (or income).  To the extent that there is a difference in
the transition rates into other states than employment between the displaced
workers and the control group, the above selection will underestimate the drop
in yearly earnings as a consequence of displacement.  A minimal extension of
the sample in the previous procedure is to include workers who have positive
yearly earnings in each of the years after displacement.  This would be a sample
selection where we come as close to the JLS selection scheme as we can with
the databases at hand.  A further procedure would be to extend the sample to
workers who have positive earnings in just one of the years after displacement. 
Tenure Condition
In some cases we consider only displaced workers with three or more years
of tenure at the year of separation.  In the Danish data set we run into sample-
size problems if the tenure condition is set higher.  The Danish tenure variable
is plant tenure while the Belgian one is firm tenure. 
In the JLS study the tenure condition was higher—“. . . workers who had
six or more years of tenure by the beginning of 1980” (p. 689). 
Migration and Commuting from the Area of Interest 
In the JLS study for Pennsylvania migration and commuting presented a
potentially severe problem.  The solution applied by JLS is (p. 689): “. . . we
have eliminated from our sample the approximately 25 percent of high-tenured
separators who subsequently never have positive earnings in our data,” and
“Finally, to reduce biases due to sample attrition, we required that every worker
receive some wage or salary earnings during each calendar year.”
For Belgium and Denmark this is probably not a major problem, as the
amount of commuting and immigration to other countries is limited compared
to other states in the United States.
Reemployment
In the Danish data set a worker is considered reemployed if the worker has
a job the next November, when each Danish resident is assigned a particular
labor market status.  For Belgium an employment and labor market status is
constructed for each worker by the end of the year.  This construction should
come as close to the IDA definition as possible. 
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In the JLS study (p. 689) workers were considered reemployed if the wage
income is positive each calendar year.
Comparison Groups (for Income and Wage Losses)
For Belgium and Denmark we select employees in one particular year, and
comparison groups are found among these workers.  Workers who enter em-
ployment in subsequent years are excluded from the analysis.  The main com-
parison groups to the displaced workers considered in this study are all other
workers and nondisplaced workers in displacing establishments.
The JLS study considered different variants of control groups.  JLS (p.
690) considered “separators,” which must be all workers leaving a firm.  The
separators were divided in “non-mass layoffs” and “mass layoffs” (the dis-
placed workers according to the different selection criteria).  The rest of the
workers were labeled “stayers.”
OTHER ISSUES
Years, Sample Period
For Belgium the sample period is 1978 to 1985.  Dismissal is considered
from 1983 to 1984.  This makes it possible to trace the effect of displacement
two years after its occurrence.  The maximum length of tenure in the Belgian
data is six years.  For Denmark the sample period is 1980 to 1991.  Dismissal
is considered from 1988 to 1989.  Calculations on the consequences two years
after displacement are possible.  The maximum length of tenure in the Danish
data for the year 1988 is eight years.
In the JLS study, the sample period was 1974 through 1986.  The observa-
tion unit was quarterly, and the data are quarterly observations, although some
of the conditioning was performed on a yearly basis. 
Aggregate Economic Conditions
For Belgium and Denmark, the years of displacement were moderate to se-
vere with  respect to economic activity.
For the JLS study, the conditions were unusually severe in Pennsylvania.  
Unemployment
For Belgium, there is information on the number of days unemployment
benefit has been paid out.  There is also information on the number of days of
employment.  For Denmark there is information on a quarterly basis on the
share of the normal working time when unemployment benefits have been paid
out.  For both Belgium and Denmark we calculate the length of the unemploy-
ment spell after displacement before the entrance into a new job.  The unit of
measurement is months. 
511
References
Burda, M.W.  1988.  “Unemployment in Europe.” Economic Policy 7: 391–
426.
Blanpain, R.  1994.  “Employment Security Laws in Belgium.”  In Employ-
ment Security: Law and Practice in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the European Communities, R. Blanpain
and T. Hanami, eds.   Leuven (Belgium): Peeters Press, pp. 67–88. 
Jacobson, Louis, Robert LaLonde, and Daniel Sullivan.  1993.  “Earnings
Losses of Displaced Workers.”  American Economic Review 83(4): 685–
709.
Scheuer, Steen.  1997.  Arbejdstid og overenskomst.  Copenhagen: Nytfra
Samfunds-videnskaberne.
World Economic Forum.  1997.  The Global Competitiveness Report.
Geneva, Switzerland.
512 Albæk, Van Audenrode, and Browning






W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Losing work, moving on : international perspectives on worker displacement / Peter J. 
Kuhn, editor.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88099-233-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-234-4 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Displaced workers—Case studies. 2. Unemployment—Case studies. 3.





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Leoni McVey.
Printed in the United States of America.
